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Abstract
As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain
of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity
in this context, to be called µ-additivity. We find that µ-Additivity, together
with two quite compelling axioms, Anonymity and Continuity, identify the
Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by O’Neill (1982)
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1. Introduction
There is empirical evidence pointing out the large number of firms in-
volved in some merging process. As a recent example, let us mention that,
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in Spain, it is expected that the number of (regional) saving banks will be
drastically reduced from 45 in 2009 to 20 after the restructuring process
in which the financial sector is involved. The reasons justifying why firms
merge include the effort to gain market power, tax advantages of taking over
a loss making firm, efficiency, increasing market share and diversification
among other factors. Simultaneously to this merging wave, we found that
the number of firms going bankrupt has also grown. This fact can be partially
explained by the global financial crisis.
What this paper tries to explain is how the debtors of a bankrupted firm
should be reimbursed. Taking into account that they could not avoid, nor
promote, any merging process, the procedure employed to solve our problem
should be neutral to the presence of any merging process. By neutrality we
mean that what each creditor would lose, due to the bankruptcy situation,
should not be affected by any entrepreneurial alliance. The question is quite
simple but, as this paper will point out, its analysis is not trivial.
The particular way that we will model this economic problem allows it to
be also applied to some other distribution situations like how to share out a
deceased estate among its inheritors, the design of (multi-issues) tax or tariff
systems, etc. Therefore, we will follow the approach introduced by O’Neill
(1982), when formulating solutions for bankruptcy problems. The analysis of
bankruptcy problems can be considered a simple and robust tool to model
how agents should be rationed. In these situations, each agent in a group
asks for a quantity of a perfectly divisible good, but the available amount is
not enough to satisfy all the agents’ demands.
The literature proposes mainly two approaches to provide satisfactory so-
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lutions for these problems. The first one, the axiomatic analysis, proposes
particular solutions arising from the assumption that some ‘Equity Princi-
ples’ should prevail. The study by Thomson (2003) provides a nice overview
of the main results following this methodology. The second approach is based
on a interpretation of bankruptcy problems as (transferable utility) cooper-
ative games, TU-games henceforth. This formulation, introduced by O’Neill
(1982), has been employed to argue in favor of some particular rules. Re-
garding this, see the papers by O’Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler
(1985).
This close relationship between bankruptcy situations and cooperative
games might well lead to analyze how strong the liaison between both frame-
works is. When concentrating on solutions for TU-games, and related to
properties reflecting neutrality on the distributive process, additivity is one
of the most extensively imposed requirements. In fact, the fulfillment of
this property has been extensively demanded in a huge family of allocation
problems analyzed from a co-operative perspective. Just as an illustrative
example, Moretti and Patrone (2008) refers to the Shapley value application
to cost allocation, social networks, water issues, biology, reliability theory
and belief formation. It is well-known that, in his seminal paper, Shapley
(1953) pointed out the additivity of the value he proposed.
When concentrating on bankruptcy situations, additivity of a solution
imposes, as in TU-games frameworks, neutrality on the distributive process.
Just to illustrate it, let us consider a creditor lending some funds to two
firms, say A and B. After a merging process, involving both firms the new
corporation, to be called C, bankrupts. When reimbursing this corporation’s
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creditors, one can propose two ways to proceed. The first one is considering
the problem of (partially) reimbursing C’s creditors; whereas the second one
lies in solving the ‘primitive’ problems related to A and B with respect to
their creditors. What additivity should require is that both processes yield
the same outcome.
As far as we know, the paper by Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001)
is the only one which explores additivity in Bankruptcy frameworks. Their
conclusions in that matter can be summarized as follows:
(1) There is no bankruptcy rule satisfying additivity; and
(2) If we concentrate on a (very restrictive) family of bankruptcy problems,
the Ibn Ezra’s rule is the only one which conciliates additivity and
equal treatment.
Therefore, what Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001) points out is that
additivity is a very demanding property in our framework.4 Moreover, if we
want to explore bankruptcy rules that, being well-defined for any problem,
satisfy some weak version of additivity, we must limit ourselves to considering
rules that coincide with the Ibn Ezra’s proposal in the framework in which
it is defined.
Taking into account the above restrictions, this paper proposes a weak
notion of additivity, that we call µ-Additivity, and a study of the bankruptcy
rules satisfying it. What we find is that the only rule for which anonymity,
4Section 3 discusses the rationale of such a fact both from an economical and a math-
ematical point of view.
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continuity and µ-Additivity are compatible is the Minimal Overlap Rule, in-
troduced by O’Neill (1982).
Anonymity and Continuity are two properties which have been widely
justified in the literature for Bankruptcy problems. What µ-additivity would
suggest is that additivity should be a requirement for comparable problems,
from the creditors’ point of view. Following this interpretation, and trying
to be precise in describing when two bankruptcy problems are comparable,
we consider three elements:
(1) For any two agents, their relative credits are similar, i.e. the agent con-
ceding the highest credit is the same for both problems;
(2) For each agent, her credit position, related to the debtor’s assets is sim-
ilar, i.e. her credits exceed the creditor’s assets in a problem, this
situation should not be reversed in the other; and
(3) The sacrifice that each agent would impose on her ‘rivals’, if her credit
is the first to be paid, should always (or never) be lower than such a
credit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and the main definitions related to bankruptcy problems. Section 3
discusses the notion of Additivity from a bankruptcy perspective and, based
on some impossibility results, introduces the notion of ‘Partial Additivity’.
Section 4 provides our main result, consisting on an axiomatization of the
Minimal Overlap Rule based on the weak additivity property, discussed in
the previous section. Technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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2. Bankruptcy. The Framework and Main Definitions.
Let us consider an individual, the debtor, having some debts. Let N =
{1, . . . , i, . . . , n} denote the set of her creditors, that will be considered fixed
throughout the paper. E ≥ 0 will denote the valuation of the debtor’s
assets, and will be called the Estate. For any fixed creditor, say i, ci ≥ 0
will denote her credit, i.e. the quantity that the debtor owes to her. Vector
c = (c1, . . . , ci, . . . , cn) summarizes creditors’ claims. We say that the debtor
goes bankrupt if she has not enough assets to reimburse her debts.
Following the above, a bankruptcy problem can be fully described by a
vector (E, c) ∈ R+ × Rn+ such that
E ≤
n∑
i=1
ci (1)
Note that Condition (1) reflects that reimbursing creditors’ debts might
be incompatible. Therefore, these agents’ aspirations (on recovering their
debts) would be rationed. Let B denote the family of all the bankruptcy
problems. For notational convenience, we describe the set of bankruptcy
problems having a ‘super-creditor’, i.e. an individual whose credit is not
lower than the estate, as
BS =
{
(E, c) ∈ B:E ≤ max
i∈N
ci
}
(2)
and, for any family of bankruptcy problems, say B? ⊆ B, BO? will denote the
subclass of problems with increasingly ordered claims
BO? = {(E, c) ∈ B?: ci ≤ cj whenever i ≤ j} (3)
Definition 1. A Bankruptcy rule is a function ϕ:B → Rn+, such that for
each problem (E, c) ∈ B,
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(a)
∑n
i=1 ϕi (E, c) = E; and
(b) 0 ≤ ϕi (E, c) ≤ ci for each creditor i.
Among the many rules that have been explored in the literature, we will
introduce those two that will be most useful in our analysis.5 The first one,
to be called Ibn Ezra’s rule, is a ‘semi-solution’ in the sense that it is not
defined for every problem. The second one, known as the Minimal Overlap
rule, was proposed by O’Neill (1982) as a possible extension of Ibn Ezra’s
rule to be defined for any problem.
In order to properly define the above rules, let us consider a problem
(E, c) ∈ BO.6 We say that it is an Ibn Ezra’s problem if and only if it has a
super-creditor.
Definition 2. Ibn Ezra’s rule is the function ϕIE:BS → Rn+, associating to
each problem (E, c) ∈ BOS , and creditor i, the amount
ϕIEi (E, c) =
i∑
j=1
min {E, cj} −min {E, cj−1}
n− j + 1 (4)
where c0 = 0.
Chun and Thomson (2005) proposes a formal description for the Minimal
Overlap rule. What these authors suggest is to proceed as follows. Let us
5As we have already mentioned, the reader can find a nice and complete overview of
the most relevant Bankruptcy rules in Thomson (2003).
6For expository simplicity and technical convenience, we assume that creditors’ claims
are increasingly ordered. Otherwise, we can re-arrange the creditors’ labels to reach this
objective. Therefore, even though this assumption is proposed, the Ibn Ezra’s and Minimal
Overlap rules are also defined when the agents’ claims are not increasingly ordered.
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consider a bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BO, then what each creditor recovers
is described as follows:
(a) if (E, c) ∈ BS then
ϕMO (E, c) = ϕIE (E, c) ; or (5)
(b) if (E, c) /∈ BS then there is a unique t? ≥ 0 such that
t? = E −
n∑
i=1
max {ci − t?, 0} . (6)
In such a case, the Minimal Overlap rule associates to creditor i the
amount
ϕMOi (E, c) = ϕ
IE
i (E − t?, c) + max {ci − t?, 0} . (7)
Recently, Alcalde et al. (2008) found an alternative expression for the
Minimal Overlap rule, which is equivalent to the one introduced by Chun and
Thomson (2005), but helps to provide a (direct) intuition on what O’Neill
(1982) could have had in mind about how to extend the proposal by Ibn
Ezra.
Definition 3. The Minimal Overlap rule is the function ϕMO:B → Rn+, that
associates, to each problem (E, c), the vector
ϕMO (E, c) = ϕIE (min {E, cn} , c) + ϕcel (Er, cr) (8)
where ϕcel stands for the Constrained Equal Losses rule and the ‘residual’
bankruptcy problem, to which the Ibn Ezra’s rule was not applied, is de-
scribed by Er = max {E − cn, 0}, and cr = c− ϕIE (min {E, cn} , c).
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3. Additivity and Bankruptcy Rules
The aim of this section is to introduce a discussion on the notion of
additivity in the framework of bankruptcy problems. Just to illustrate it,
let us consider the following example. A creditor, say i, loans some quantity
to two firms, say F and G. Let cFi and c
G
i denote these quantities. After a
merging process, firm H emerges as the fusion of F and G and, unfortunately
H goes bankrupt. If we denote by EF and EG the valuations of firms F and
G respectively; and their respective debts vectors are denoted by cF and cG,
we can have that7
(a) EH = EF + EG, and
(b) cH = cF + cG
What creditor i would expect to obtain at the division process, for any
Bankruptcy rule, say ϕ is
ϕi
(
EH , cH
) ≥ ϕi (EF , cF )+ ϕi (EG, cG)
Note that, otherwise, i could claim that she has been ‘punished’ due to the
merging process, and she would not have the ability to object against such
a decision made by the two firms. If such an argument is extended to all the
creditors we have that the above inequality must become an equality. This
is the essence of the additivity notion.
7We are implicitly assuming that N , the set of creditors, is the same for both firms,
and that there are no intra-group debts, i.e. F is not a G’s creditor or a debtor.
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Definition 4. Let ϕ be a Bankruptcy rule. We say that it satisfies addi-
tivity if for any two problems, (E1, c1) and (E2, c2) we have that
ϕ
(
E1, c1
)
+ ϕ
(
E2, c2
)
= ϕ
(
E1 + E2, c1 + c2
)
. (9)
Bergantin˜os and Me´ndez-Naya (2001) provided an example pointing out
that additivity is a very demanding property for Bankruptcy rules. This is
why they could show that there is no rule satisfying additivity.
Some reasons justifying this fact can be found. The first one lies in
the relationship between bankruptcy problems and the TU-games, as sug-
gested by O’Neill (1982). This author proposed to associate to each bank-
ruptcy problem (E, c) the TU-game (N , V ), where the characteristic function
V : 2N → R+ assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N the amount
V (S) = max
{
E −
∑
i/∈S
ci, 0
}
. (10)
In this sense, Example 1 points out that additivity of bankruptcy problems
might not induce additivity of the respective TU-games.
Example 1. Let us consider the following three-agent bankruptcy problems.
(E, c) = (9, (8, 8, 8)), and (E ′, c′) = (31, (4, 12, 22)). Therefore, the aggregate
bankruptcy problem is (E + E ′, c+ c′) = (40, (12, 20, 30)). Let V (resp. V ′,
V ′′) denote the characteristic function relative to the problem (E, c) (resp.
(E ′, c′), (E + E ′, c+ c′)). Following Equation (10) we have that
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S V (S) V ′ (S) V ′′ (S) V (S) + V ′ (S)
{1} 0 0 0 0
{2} 0 5 0 5
{3} 0 15 8 15
{1, 2} 1 9 10 10
{1, 3} 1 19 20 20
{2, 3} 1 27 28 28
{1, 2, 3} 9 31 40 40
Therefore, the TU-game induced by adding the two bankruptcy problems
differs from the addition of the TU-games induced by both problems.
The second reason which explains that additivity is a strong requirement,
comes from an economic perspective. Let us consider a company that can
be seen as the result of a merging process involving some firms. When the
company as a whole, goes bankrupt, the degree of bankruptcy,8 is not
usually homogeneous considering the firms that configure the company. This
will justify the fact that not all the creditors should be rationed, taking into
account the company’s financial situation, but that of the firms receiving
their credits. Therefore, what this situation suggests is that additivity, as in-
troduced by Definition 4, might not be a reasonable property for Bankruptcy
rules, unless the problems to be added share at least, a ‘similar bankruptcy
8Given a bankruptcy problem (E, c), we can define its degree of bankruptcy as the
expression
D (E, c) = 1− E∑n
i=1 ci
.
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degree’.
4. µ-Additivity and the Minimal Overlap Rule
The aim of this section is to describe reasonable conditions under which
additivity is both satisfied by some bankruptcy rules and justified from an
economic point of view. The main idea for our requirements starts from
considering not only the ‘degree of bankruptcy’ as a comparison measure,
but also what each creditor would impose on her ‘rivals’ as a sacrifice when
her debts were completely reimbursed.
Just to formalize the above idea, let us consider the following scenario.
Given a bankruptcy problem (E, c), and an agent i ∈ N , Ei = max {0, E − ci}
denotes the amount that agents other than i would distribute after fully reim-
bursing (if possible) i’s credits. We will denote by µi (E, c) the (constrained
egalitarian) loss in which agents, other than i, incur when i’s credits have
been, as much as possible, reimbursed; i.e. µi (E, c) is the unique solution to∑
j 6=i
max {0, cj − µi (E, c)} = Ei.
A notion for level of imposed sacrifice, by an agent to her rivals, would
lie in how the above idea is related to such an agent’s claim.
Definition 5. Given a bankruptcy problem (E, c), we say that agent i’s
claim is under-transferred if, and only if, µi (E, c) < ci.
We now introduce a notion of partial additivity which is satisfied by some
Bankruptcy rules.
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Axiom 1. We say that a Bankruptcy rule, say ϕ, satisfies µ-Additivity if
ϕ (E, c) + ϕ (E ′, c′) = ϕ (E + E ′, c+ c′) .
for any two problems (E, c) and (E ′, c′) such that
(a) (ci − cj)
(
c
′
i − c′j
) ≥ 0 for each i and j in N ;
(b) (E − ci)
(
E − c′i
) ≥ 0 for each i in N ; and
(c) Each agent’s claim is under-transferred in (E, c) if, and only if, it is
under-transferred in (E ′, c′) ,
Note that what Axiom 1 suggests is that additivity should be preserved
in problems sharing some similarities related to their internal structure:
(a) In both problems the agents’ claims should be ordered in a similar way,
i.e. if i’s claim is greater that j’s claim in a problem, it should not be
the case that j’s claim is greater that i’s claim in the other.
(b) In both problems, each agent’s claim should have the same position rel-
ative to the estate, i.e. if some agent’s claim is lower than the estate
in a problem, it should not be the case that, for the other problem, her
claim exceeds the estate. And,
(c) In both problems the level of imposed sacrifice by each agent, should
have the same position, related to her claim.
In order to present our main result, we need to introduce two axioms
that are usually employed in Bankruptcy Theory. The first one, anonymity,
establishes that what each creditor recovers does not depend on her name,
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but on the internal structure of the problem. The second one is the classical
requirement of continuity.
Axiom 2. We say that a Bankruptcy rule, say ϕ, satisfies Anonymity, or
is anonymous, if for each problem (E, c) and any permutation9 pi,
pi [ϕ (E, c)] = ϕ (E, pi (c)) .
Axiom 3. We say that Bankruptcy rule ϕ satisfies Continuity, or is con-
tinuous, if for each sequence of bankruptcy problems {Eν , cν}ν∈N, if
lim
ν→∞
{Eν , cν} = (E, c) ∈ B.
then
lim
ν→∞
ϕ (Eν , cν) = ϕ (E, c) .
We can now establish the following result, whose proof is relegated to the
Appendix.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ be a Bankruptcy rule. ϕ satisfies Anonymity, Conti-
nuity and µ-Additivity if, and only if, ϕ is the Minimal Overlap rule.
By way of conclusion, let us mention that Theorem 1 is tight in the sense
that the uniqueness result requires all the three axioms, and no axiom is
implied by the other two. Just to clarify that, let us note that:
9A permutation pi is a bijection applying N onto itself. In this paper, and abusing
notation, pi (c) will denote the claims vector obtained by applying permutation pi to its
components, i.e. the i-th component for pi (c) is cj whenever j = pi (i). Similar reasoning
considerations apply for pi [ϕ (E, c)].
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(a) The Constrained Equal Awards rule is both continuous and anonymous
but fails to satisfy µ-additivity;
(b) Any asymmetric Bankruptcy rule belonging to the family that Alcalde
et al. (2008) called the Weighted Minimal Overlap rules is both contin-
uous and µ-additive, but does not satisfy anonymity, and
(c) Let us consider the Bankruptcy rule ϕc that suggests the Ibn Ezra’s
proposal for any problem (E, c) such that E ≤ maxi∈N , and otherwise,
if P denotes the set of agents whose claims are under-transferred,
ϕci (E, c) =
 0 if i /∈ Pϕceli (E,({0}j /∈P , {c}j∈P)) if i ∈ P
where ϕcel stands for the Constrained Equal Losses rule. Note that this
rule is anonymous and µ-additive but fails to be continuous.
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Appendix A. A Proof for Theorem 1
Throughout this Appendix we assume, without loss of generality, that
c is increasingly ordered i.e., ci ≤ cj whenever i < j. For simplicity of
exposition, for a given problem (E, c) we denote cE the claims vector whose
i-th component is cEi = min {ci, E}, for each agent i ∈ N .
We first provide a result establishing that, under Continuity, µ-Additivity
implies Invariance under Claims Truncation.
Proposition 1. Let ϕ be a Bankruptcy rule satisfying µ-Additivity and Con-
tinuity. Then it satisfies Invariance under Claims Truncation, i.e. for each
problem (E, c), ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
E, cE
)
.
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Proof. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying µ-Additivity and Continuity. Let (E, c) be
a problem where 0 < E < cn = maxi∈N {ci}; and let S ⊂ N be the subset of
agents claiming zero. Let us consider the following two cases.
Case 1: cn = cn−1 or cn−1 < E
Therefore, by µ-Additivity,
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
E − 1
r
,
(
(0)i∈S,
(
cEi −
1
r
)
i∈N\S
))
+
+ϕ
((
1
r
)
,
(
(0)i∈S ,
(
ci − cEi +
1
r
)
i∈N\S
))
for all r ∈ N such that
1
r
< min
{
min
i∈N\S
{ci} , cn − E
}
.
Now, by considering the limit when r goes to infinity in the previous
equation and taking into account that ϕ is continuous, we obtain
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
E, cE
)
+ ϕ
(
0, c− cE) = ϕ (E, cE) .
Case 2: E ≤ cn−1 < cn
By µ-Additivity,
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
E − 1
r
,
(
(0)i∈S,
(
cEi −
1
r
)
i∈N\S∪{n}
, cEn −
1
2r
))
+
+ϕ
((
1
r
)
,
(
(0)i∈S ,
(
ci − cEi +
1
r
)
i∈N\S∪{n}
, cn − cEn +
1
2r
))
for all r ∈ N such that
1
r
< min
{
min
i∈N\S
{ci} , max
i∈N :E<ci<cn
{ci − E} , 2 (cn − cn−1)
}
.
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Now, by considering the limit when r goes to infinity in the previous equation
and taking into account that ϕ is continuous, we obtain
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
E, cE
)
+ ϕ
(
0, c− cE) = ϕ (E, cE) .

Proof of Theorem 1
Firstly, it is straightforward to verify that the Minimal Overlap rule sat-
isfies Anonymity, Continuity and µ-Additivity.
Now, let ϕ be a rule satisfying these axioms. Given a problem (E, c) ∈ B,
let us consider the following two cases:
Case 1: E ≤ cn.
By Proposition 1 we have that
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
E, cE
)
Let us denote P 1 = cE1 ; for 1 < i ≤ n, P i = cEi − cEi−1. And for each
i ∈ N , let denote cP i =
(
(0)j<i , (P
i)j≥i
)
.
Now, let us consider the following two subcases:
Subcase 1.a: cEn = c
E
n−1.
µ-Additivity implies that
ϕ
(
E, cE
)
=
∑
i∈N
ϕ
(
P i, cP
i
)
.
Therefore, by Anonymity and Proposition 1,
ϕj
(
P i, cP
i
)
=
 0 if j < iP i
n−i+1 if j ≥ i
,
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i.e.
ϕj
(
P i, cP
i
)
=
 0 if j < icEi −cEi−1
n−i+1 if j ≥ i
with c0 = 0.
10 And, thus, for each agent h
ϕh
(
E, cE
)
=
∑
i∈N
ϕh
(
P i, cP
i
)
Since, for any j > h we have that cP
j
h = 0,
ϕh
(
E, cE
)
=
h∑
i=1
ϕh
(
P i, cP
i
)
=
h∑
i=1
cEi − cEi−1
n− i+ 1 =
=
h∑
i=1
min {ci, E} −min {ci−1, E}
n− i+ 1 = ϕ
MO
h (E, c) .
Subcase 1.b: cEn 6= cEn−1.
Let q (j) denote the cardinality of the set {i ≤ j:P i 6= 0} . By µ-Additivity
we have
ϕ
(
E, cE
)
= ϕ
(
P 1 +
1
r
,
((
cP
1
)
i<n
, cP
1
+
1
r
))
+
+
∑
i<n:P i 6=0
ϕ
(
P i − 1
r (q (n)− 1) ,
(
max
{
0, cP
i − 1
r (q (n)− 1)
})
j∈N
)
+
+ϕ
(
P n − 1
r (q (n)− 1) ,
(
0,
(
min
{
cp
i
,
1
r
})
1<i<n
, cP
n
n −
1
r (q (n)− 1)
))
,
where r ∈ N is such that
1
r
< min
{(
1− 1
q (n)
)
P n, min
i:P i 6=0
{
P i
}}
.
10Throughout this proof, and for notational convenience, we will consider c0 = c
E
0 = 0.
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Now, by considering the limit when r goes to infinity in the previous
equation, by Continuity we obtain
ϕ
(
E, cE
)
=
∑
i∈N
ϕ
(
P i, cP
i
)
.
By using the reasoning of the Subcase 1.a above, we obtain that for each
agent h
ϕh
(
E, cE
)
= ϕMOh (E, c) .
Case 2: E > cn.
In such a case, there is a unique t, 0 ≤ t < cn, such that∑
i∈N
max {0, ci − t} = E − t.
Let k be the unique agent such that ck − t > 0, and ck−1 − t ≤ 0. Note
that this implies that, for each agent j, with j ≤ k, we have that cj is
under-transferred. Then, for each r ∈ N such that
1
r
< min {E − t, (n− k − 1) (ck − t)}
by µ-Additivity we have that,
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
t+ 1
r
,
(
(ci)i<k ,
(
t+ 1
r(n−k+1)
)
i≥k
))
+ ϕ
(
E − t− 1
r
,
(
(0)i<k ,
(
ci − t− 1r(n−k+1)
)
i≥k
)) (A.1)
Let us consider the limit, when r goes to infinity, in the equation (A.1)
above. By Continuity, we have
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ
(
t, (min {ci, t})i∈N
)
+ ϕ
(
E − t, (max {0, ci − t})i∈N
)
.
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Observe that the problem
(
t, (min {ci, t})i∈N
)
was analyzed in Case 1
above. Therefore, for each agent h, we have that
ϕh
(
t, (min {ci, t})i∈N
)
=
h∑
i=1
min {ci, t} −min {ci−1, t}
n− i+ 1 . (A.2)
Moreover, note that for agent h we have that
max {0, ch − t} =
 0 if h < kch − t if h ≥ k .
Since by construction
n∑
i=1
max {0, ci − t} = E − t,
we can conclude that for each agent h,
ϕh
(
E − t, (max {0, ci − t})i∈N
)
= max {0, ch − t} . (A.3)
Therefore, by combining equations (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3), we have that, for
each agent h,
ϕh (E, c) =
h∑
i=1
min {ci, t} −min {ci−1, t}
n− i+ 1 + max {0, ch − t} = ϕ
MO
h (E, c) .

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